POLITICAL CAPTURE AND INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS IN PAKISTAN: EXAMINING THE PERFORMANCE OF ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONS

Abstract

Multiple institutions have been established in Pakistan to fight corruption, such as the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NAB), Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), and the Anti-Corruption Establishments (ACEs) in the provinces; however, corruption is still a problem today. Existing literature often treats political interference and institutional weakness as separate explanations for this failure. This study investigates the performance of these three institutions and the reason behind their underperformance. The aim is to evaluate the impact of political capture and institutional weaknesses in Pakistan on anti-corruption effectiveness. A qualitative, document-based methodology is used, evaluating institutions across six factors: case handling and backlog, conviction rate, political neutrality, institutional independence, resources and capacity, and legal powers. The findings reveal the same trend in each of the three institutions decreasing conviction rates, continued backlogs, politically-tainted appointments, and legal changes that have reduced the scope of investigations. These weaknesses reinforce one another, with political interference limiting independence and legal reach, which further weakens performance. The study concludes that meaningful reform requires addressing political interference and institutional capacity together, rather than as separate issues.